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Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social del Partido y la
Revolución:
An Overview of Cuban Domestic Reform
International Immersion Program - Cuba
Jessica Gonzalez
The United States and Cuba shocked the international scene when, on December 17,
2014, they announced their intention to restore full diplomatic ties.1 After more than fifty years
of hostility between the neighbors, both countries committed to address their grievances in the
hopes of obtaining resolution over separation. The United States, in particular, agreed to ease its
restrictions on travel, banking, and remittances,2 and significantly, in a later concession, to
remove Cuba from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.3 While it seems unlikely that the United
States Congress will fully remove the laws enforcing its embargo anytime soon,4 these recent
events embody a substantial step forward in US-Cuba relations, as well as the latter’s shifts in
international policy.
While restoring diplomatic relations will likely lead to changes on the island, solely
focusing on the influence the US will have on the communist system would be misleading.
Change has been happening. Raúl Castro has not followed in the footsteps of his brother. When
crisis hit the island following the fall of the USSR, Fidel’s regime implemented severe austerity
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measures to cope with the ensuing economic contraction.5 This “Special Period” of the
Revolution was marked by new rationing schedules, the cutting of gasoline and fuel supplies,
and the reduction of factory work hours.6 Raúl, by contrast, has led the Cuban government to
reform its communist system, all the while affirming a continued adherence to socialist ideology.
Rather than attempting to weather the storm of economic crisis, Cuba is opening up.
Fifty-seven years into its Revolution, Cuba is evolving. Its interactions with the United
States are indicative of this change, but they are only part of the story. To explore how Cuba has
been changing even prior to resumption of diplomatic relations with the US, this paper will
review some of the obstacles Cuba has faced in recent years and its attempts to reform in light of
these challenges. In particular, this paper focuses on one particular endeavor to bring about
reform: los Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social Del Partido y la Revolución.7 Put
forward in 2011 by the Communist Party of Cuba (Party), these lineamientos (guidelines) outline
Party policy for sweeping reform in areas ranging from macroeconomic, social, to environmental
policy. The next few pages will provide an overview of the lineamientos, including the history
leading up to their implementation and the substantive changes they reflect, and will conclude
with reflections on their potential.

1. Previous Reforms
Cuba has faced numerous challenges in the years following the Revolution. Its economic
ties with other communist countries, including its relationship with the USSR and membership in
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the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), enabled it to grow even after its
Western ties were severed. The USSR’s financing of Cuba’s bilateral trade deficit, for example,
insulated the island from international market pressures. But with the fall of the USSR, Cuba’s
economic strategy had to change. It needed to become self-sufficient to stay afloat.
The opening pages of the lineamientos record recent attempts made by the Cuban
government to resolve economic sluggishness and inefficiency. Even after having weathered the
difficulties of the Special Period, the Cuban economy remained weak. The introduction notes
that, in 2005, three years prior to Raúl Castro’s accession to the presidency, problems became
readily apparent. These problems included deficits in Cuban balance of payments, bank
retentions of overseas transfers, and overdue payables.8 In response, the Cuban government
undertook a number of measures, the general overview of which are provided for in the
introduction. To begin with, the Cuban State was reorganized in pursuit of greater institutional
strength. Economic planning was adjusted to available resources, and growth, the diversification
of exports, and the substitution of imports were given priority. Capital investment policy was
revised, available foreign credit was relocated to those projects with the strongest impact on
Cuba’s balance of payments, and the country’s foreign debt payments were rescheduled. There
was also reform in the agricultural sector, including legislative action distributing fallow Stateowned land to increase food output and to reduce food imports. Finally, the State embarked on a
number of strategic industrial projects to further development.9
The next few pages expand on some of the major reforms undertaken by the Cuban
government:
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Ideology. At the foundation of these reforms is a general shift in ideology. Not from
socialism to capitalism. Not from centralized planning to a market economy. The Cuban
government repeatedly reaffirms its commitment to communism. This shift is more subtle. It is a
shift to pragmatism to overcome some of the flaws in the socialist system, all the while avoiding
a truly market approach. As Castro stated, “ideas chart the course, the reality of figures is
decisive.”10 One of Castro’s approaches has been to clarify the purpose and direction of the
socialist experiment. In a 2010 speech, Castro asserted that there needed to be a change to
“erroneous and unsustainable concepts about socialism that have been deeply rooted in broad
sectors of the population over the years, as a result of the excessively paternalistic, idealistic, and
egalitarian approach instituted by the Revolution in the interest of social justice.”11 Rather, as he
stated in his inaugural address, “[Cubans] must make efforts to find the ways and means to
remove any deterrent to productive forces. In many respects, local initiative can be effective and
viable.”12 This shift away from idealism and towards pragmatism is reflected in the reforms
brought about by Raúl’s administration. Greater emphasis on personal accountability and
rewards for higher productivity have set the foundation upon which market-type policies have
been set.
Government. The government itself has been the target of reforms. In March of 2009,
Castro purged Fidel’s economic cabinet, replacing it with “trusted military men” and “reformminded technocrats.”13 Two months later, the head of the central bank was replaced following
his resignation. In August of the same year, the National Assembly of People’s Power (National
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Assembly), the legislative body of the Cuban government, established the office of the
Comptroller General of the Republic, which, according to Castro, would improve economic
discipline and target corruption. 14 In removing entrenched powers from the government, Raúl’s
administration set the course for greater reform and responsiveness to economic stagnation, even
as it faced internal tension as the established old guard was supplanted by new, reform-minded
administrators.
Agriculture. Raúl has publically classified food production as a top government priority
and matter of national security. In a “return to the land,” the Cuban government promoted
policies intended to increase domestic production of food.15 This process began in 2008, and
included the decentralization of decision-making, the aforementioned leasing of fallow land,
increases in prices paid to farmers, and the loosening of regulations preventing farmers from
selling directly to consumers. Whereas the ministry of agriculture in Havana had previously
decided which crops and livestock to produce, that authority was transferred to Cuba’s 169
municipalities.16 The Granma, a Cuban newspaper, also reported on the agricultural sector’s high
costs, low productivity, and obstacles to income growth. It reflected on the bloated size of that
sector, pointing to an excess of 89,000 administrative workers.17 With regards to land, emphasis
has been placed on using idle land, rather than moving significantly towards privatization. Fiftyfour percent of idle state land, according to Raúl’s report to the National Assembly, has been
granted in usufruct, affecting around 100,000 people.18 In August of 2010, the government also
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issued new rules authorizing small farmers and Cubans with small garden plots to sell directly to
consumers.19
New Business. Many of the reforms also created opportunities for new businesses. In
September of 2009, for example, Cuba began to issue licenses to food vendors in various cities.
By 2010, the government announced it would lay off more than 500,000 state workers and add
250,000 licenses for family businesses. Around 200,000 state jobs were switched over to
cooperatives, leasing, and other alternative arrangements.20 The state also began, in January of
2011, to issue microcredits to leaseholders of farmland. Later that same year, the government
announced that 120,000 people had leased land since 2008. It also noted that 180,000 people had
taken out licenses to work for themselves and to rent space to new entrepreneurs since October
of the previous year. State banks were given authority to issue microcredits to new entrepreneurs,
and state bodies were permitted to transact with them. Stimulating private business as a means to
stimulate economic growth deviates from the traditional socialist model, and has been a
pragmatic policy of the current administration.
Labor. Finally, workers were also the target of a number of reforms. Under Raúl’s
leadership, the cap on productivity related bonus payments was lifted, resulting in a new system
tying income to productivity.21 Workers were also permitted to take on more work, with students
allowed to work part time, and full-time workers to hold multiple jobs.22 Each of these changes
amplified the opportunities given to Cuban workers, allowing them to increase their earnings and
thereby achieve higher standards of living.
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This sampling of the reforms taken by Raul’s administration is not exhaustive.
Nonetheless, it is indicative of the tenor of the overall change. Less centralized planning, more
opportunities for new business owners and workers, and greater compensation for higher
productivity, are examples of the type of reform the current administration has hoped would keep
the socialist project alive.
2. Problems
“Today, more than ever, the economic battle is the main task and the focus of the ideological
work of the cadres, because the sustainability and preservation of our social system depend on
that.”23
General de Ejército Raúl Castro Ruz

While notable, the reforms mentioned above have not effectively staved off economic
distress. In an attempt to revive the economy, the Party put forward lineamientos, or guidelines,
after which new law should be modeled. These, it writes, are in response to the current economic
crisis facing the country.
Introductory material to the lineamientos provides a brief overview of international
events and issues contributing to the weak economy. Recent economic, financial, energy, food,
and environmental crises have greatly impacted undeveloped countries. On the global market
Cuba, as an open economy, faces instability in the price and demand for its exports, as well as
greater obstacles to obtaining foreign credit. Cuba incurred a net loss of $10.9 billion between
1997 and 2009 as a result of price variation in its exports and imports, and the purchasing power
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of Cuban exports deteriorated by 15%. Finally, the introduction asserts that the continued United
States economic, commercial, and financial embargo has produced significant losses.24
Domestic weaknesses were also highlighted. Weather events, including 16 hurricanes
between 1998 and 2008, produced $20.564 billion dollars in losses. More notably, the
introduction points out that inefficiency, a deterioration of its production base and infrastructure,
and aging population account for some of its economic difficulties.25
Not all news was negative. Following its accession to the Alianza Bolivariana para los
Pueblos de Nuestra America (ALBA)26 in 2004, Cuba’s revenue from its supply of services, in
particular its health-care services to Venezuela, increased. Moreover, Cuba has expanded its
trading and financial relations with foreign nations, principal among them being China, Vietnam,
Russia, Angola, Iran, Brazil, and Algeria.27 Despite the inclusion of Cuba’s positive steps, these
have not compensated for weaknesses in what has become a fledgling economy.
In this introduction, the Party makes one thing clear: there is a problem. The current
Cuban economic model is not sustainable, and must be reformed to keep the country afloat.
Previous reforms have not adequately addressed the country’s ills, and it is against this backdrop
that it proposes the new lineamientos.

3. Executing a Plan
a. Commitment to Socialism
The reforms instituted by Raul’s administration have not cured the major problems
plaguing the Cuban economy. Against this background, the Party’s Sixth Congress worked to
24
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create what are now the 313 lineamentos. In generating guidelines upon which to model the
economy, politics, and social policy, the Party begins by strongly reasserting its continued
commitment to the socialist model. It notes that “the economic system that will prevail in Cuba
will continue to be based on the socialist ownership by the entire people,” and that it “will be
governed by the socialist distribution principle ‘from each according to his/her capacity, and to
each according to his/her contribution.’”28 While economic policy would be reformed, the new
model would be built with an understanding that “only socialism is capable of overcoming
difficulties and preserving the achievements of the Revolution” and that planning, and not a
market approach, is the basis for the economic model.29 The continued dedication to socialist
principles, according to the Party, will require the sustained promotion of an economic culture
that is founded upon a principle of equal rights and opportunities for all Cuban citizens. This it
distinguishes from egalitarianism, holding that work “must be remunerated in accordance to its
quantity and quality.”30
Having emphasized its commitment to continued socialism on the island, the Party puts
forward short and long term goals. In the short-term, the Party hoped to tackle the Cuban deficit
in balance of payments, substitute imports and maximize export earnings, and eliminate issues
affecting economic efficiency, motivation to work, and income distribution. Importantly, it also
aimed to create the necessary infrastructural and productive conditions to allow for greater
development.31 Long-term goals aimed towards sustainable development. These include food
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and energy self-sufficiency, an efficient use of human potential, competition in the production of
products, as well as a move towards increasing the number of products and services offered.32
b. Formulating Lineamientos
With these goals in mind, the Party goes on to note that all of its endeavors are merely an
expression of the will of the people as contained in the politics of the Party, the state, and the
government.33 While this form of rhetoric is not uncommon in any political system, the
communism for which Cuba is famous is not typically thought to accommodate the actual will of
the people. Nonetheless, in May of 2011, a few days after the publication of the lineamientos, the
Party put forward another document, “Información sobre el resultado del Debate de los
Lineamentos de la Política Económica y Social Del Partido y la Revolución34,” in which it lays
out the process by which the lineamientos were announced, debated, and modified.
The aforementioned document breaks down the period of consideration into three stages.
The first stage was a discussion of the lineamentos with the general public. This stage lasted
from December of 2010 until February of 2011. In it, the original 291 lineamientos were
discussed in 163,079 meetings with 8,913,838 participants.35 This latter statistic includes those
who attended meetings in their base organization, as well as at work, study, or community
groups. The report also details that from those meetings, 781,644 opinions were produced, and of
those, 395,000 were accepted and included in the reformulation of the lineamientos. Of those
that were not considered, 210,000 discussed issues of implementation, more than 65,000
expressed doubt or worries that would be clarified later in the process, 62,000 referred to issues
32
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already presented in different lineamientos, and finally, 50,000 either were not accepted or would
be considered in future stages.36 One hundred percent of the original lineamientos were retained,
but only 32% were kept without any changes being made. Sixty-eight percent of the lineamientos
were modified in some way or incorporated with other lineamientos. Thirty-six altogether new
lineamientos were added. After all considerations were made, at the end of this stage the number
of lineamentos had increased by twenty to 311.37
The second stage involved Party delegates discussing the lineamientos in the provinces.
This lasted for three days, from the 8th to the 10th of April, 2011. Upon receiving the 311
lineamientos from the previous stage, 978 delegates and 216 invited members organized into five
commissions.38 The provincial delegations looked over and analyzed the changes made to the
lineamientos as a result of the first stage. This resulted in the approval of 257 proposals covering
146 of the lineamientos to be presented before the Sixth Congress of the Party.39
The final stage was the discussion by the five commissions before the Sixth Congress.
Nine hundred eighty six delegates and ninety-seven invited members participated. This
discussion resulted in 86 lineamientos being modified, reflecting 28% of the total number. Two
additional lineamientos were also added, resulting in the final total of 313.40
Concluding its discussion of the process of formulating the lineamientos, the document
puts forward that, because the lineamentos were the object of analysis during three periods, and
that because the lineamientos reflect, in part, the 781,644 proposals springing from the first
stage, they are an expression of the will of the people, as reflected in the politics of the Party, the
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state, and the government of Cuba.41 The remainder of the report lists out each lineamiento, its
original text, its final text, and a note on the changes it underwent.
The process laid out above is not what Americans might expect when they think of
Cuban decision-making. Of note, the Party and its Sixth Congress are not directly members of
the Cuban Government. The Sixth Congress is not the National Assembly, and these are
guidelines rather than laws. Nonetheless, the three stages above, and in particular the detailed
intake of information from the people in stage one, seem to indicate more direct participation in
the government than otherwise supposed. Unfortunately, though, information is not included on
the nature of these meetings. Nor is there more detailed disclosure on the substance of comments
made by the people. Therefore, we do not know the range of comments any individual could
make, the extent to which conversations were “guided,” or any other factors that might be
limiting. Whether public participation made a significant impact on the formulation of the
lineamientos is unknown. But, it is nonetheless clear that the Party thought it important to
disclose that public participation was part of creating the lineamientos.

4. Overview of the Lineamientos
There are 313 lineamientos. These cover topics ranging from economic management, to
investment policy, to science and technology, to social and tourism policy. In this respect, they
reflect a comprehensive overhaul of existing policy. Each lineamiento is aspirational, with very
little said about the actual laws and methods that will be used to implement them. For example,
lineamiento no. 55 reads:

41
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“Progress will be made toward the establishment of a single currency on the basis of
labor productivity and effective distribution and redistribution mechanisms. The
complexity of this goal will require rigorous preparation and implementation, both
objectively and subjectively.”42

Of the many shifts in general Party policy, a few are particularly notable:
Cooperatives. One of the most notable shifts in the lineamientos is the shift away
from purely state run enterprises and towards cooperatives. There are five lineamientos
dedicated to cooperatives alone43, with the first defining cooperatives as “a socialist form
of joint ownership” and as “a business organization that owns its estates and represents a
distinct legal person.”44 These cooperatives can enter into contractual relations with other
entities, including other cooperatives, companies, and state and non-state organizations.45
Cooperatives can also determine employee income and distribution of its profits.46
For those studying the Cuban economy, this shift towards the use of cooperatives,
including in areas outside of agriculture, is one of the most significant, if not the most
significant, change resulting from the reforms. Greater reliance on cooperatives is
deviation from the central planning model and allows for a relatively significant amount
of self-autonomy.
Credit. The lineamientos increase the amount of credit available to individuals
and organizations. Lineamiento 52 states that the supply of credit available to individuals
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for purchasing goods and services must “be increased and diversified,” taking into
consideration security requirements, capacity to repay, monetary balance, and “planned
macroeconomic indicators.”47 With regard to organizations, lineamiento 53 charges
banks to provide necessary services, including making credit available to non-state
management organizations in support of their operation. The government should also
consider the creation of capitalization accounts for equipment purchases and other similar
business purposes.
Homeownership. In the lineamientos, the Party proposes “authorizing” and
“facilitating” the sale and other transfers of houses among natural persons. It also calls
for the simplification of “housing refurbishment, rehabilitation, construction, and lease,
as well as for ownership transfers”48 to address public housing demands.
Travel. The lineamientos do not explicitly give rights to Cubans to travel abroad.
But, they do state that “consideration shall be given to a policy that facilitates Cuban
residents’ overseas travel as tourists.”49 While this measure is not purely economic, it is
indicative of Cuba’s move towards opening to the Western, non-Communist world.

5. Implementation
The lineamientos may be ambitious, but they have no legal effect until they are turned
into law by the National Assembly. Party policy is not law. The lineamientos note that legal
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instruments will be used to establish the “legal and institutional framework” to support the
aforementioned changes.50
At their conclusion, the lineamientos provide for a basic procedure for implementation.
They call on the state to oversee the implementation of these lineamiento by creating a
government commission to organize, direct, and supervise implementation; by training the staff,
agencies, and organizations, working on implementation; and by reporting on the process of
implementation.51 The Party retains the responsibility of driving and demanding that the
modernization process move forward.52 When the lineamientos were published, the Party stated
that it anticipated that the laws implementing them would be passed by 2015.

6. Reception
The lineamientos received mixed reviews. For most, they were a continuation of the
moderating policies of Raúl Castro’s administration. Opening up to the greater world, moving
towards “market” type policies, irrespective of rhetoric to the contrary, seems to confirm that the
Cuban socialist experiment is failing. A corrupt bureaucracy and black market resulting from a
weak economy are no longer sustainable.53 The island needs capital, as well as increased
productivity, necessitating this shift towards market principles. Some also consider this move to
be staving off the inevitable. The Revolution has failed, and moderate reforms are its last efforts
to stay alive.
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There are, nonetheless, entrenched interests in the Cuban state opposed to the
modernization process. The reforms are unpopular with ideological elites and leftist academics.54
The public debates surrounding the creation of the lineamientos were believed to be political
strategy by Raúl’s administration. With public support, it might be easier for the reform factions
within the Party to press the National Assembly to implement change.
General public expectations are also difficult to predict. Even though they were actively
included in the initial stages, it is not clear how the public will react to the substantive changes.
Implementation is a drawn out process, and despite the 2015 deadline, the exact timetable is
unknown. Some believe that the lineamientos will stave off unrest, providing enough selfautonomy and possibility for upward mobility to satisfy the general public. Others are more
skeptical. One local economist noted that managing the reform is crucial for the Cuban
government if it is going to prevent civil unrest. Speaking anonymously, he said that “reforms
are necessary but dangerous as they are bound to open people’s eyes and minds and lead them to
demand further deregulation.”55 Scaling back on certain restrictions, as for example, increasing
the number of seats paladars56 can have from 20 to 50, may only lead citizens to ask why
restrictions exist in the first place.57

Conclusion
Recent discussions between the United States and Cuba are significant. The possibility of
strengthening economic ties could bolster a fledgling Cuban economy. Journalists, academics,
and bloggers are already commenting on the potential for economic and social change. And they
54
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might be correct. But it would be a mistake to attribute all progress in Cuba to its US ties. Rather,
the Cuban state under the leadership of Raúl Castro has combatted economic stagnation with a
series of economic and political reforms, the most recent of which are the 313 lineamientos of
the Communist Party. These reforms reflect a shift away from centralized planning, and create
more opportunities for new businesses, cooperatives, access to credit, and reward for higher
productivity. Moreover, they were enacted in a more “democratic” manner, having been
evaluated by the general public before becoming Party policy. Perhaps this latter move was an
effort to push against the old Communist guard, perhaps it really was intentioned to involve the
Cuban people in the political process, or perhaps both. Under any of these scenarios, though, it is
clear that Cuba is changing from within. Whether a full transition to a market economy will ever
come to fruition is unknown. But at least it is clear that, for the time being, it is not just foreign
nations and investors pressuring an obstinate Cuba to reform. Its weaknesses have been noted, a
new direction has been charted, and unclear as its destination may be, Cuba is on its way.
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